The question concerning the meaning of life is important, but it immediately confronts the present authors with insurmountable obstacles from a philosophical standpoint, as it would require us to define not only what we hold to be life, but what we hold to be meaning in addition, requiring us to do both in a properly researched context. We unconditionally surrender to that challenge. Instead, we offer a vernacular, armchair approach to life’s origin and meaning, with some layman’s thoughts on the (...) meaning of origins as viewed from the biologist’s standpoint. One can observe that biologists generally approach the concept of biological meaning in the context of evolution. This is the basis for the broad resonance behind Dobzhansky’s appraisal that “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”. Biologists try to understand living things in the historical context of how they arose, without giving much thought to the definition of what life or living things are, which for a biologist is usually not an interesting question in the practical context of daily dealings with organisms. Do humans generally understand life’s meaning in the context of history? If we consider the problem of life’s origin, the question of what constitutes a living thing becomes somewhat more acute for the biologist, though not more answerable, because it is inescapable that there was a time when there were no organisms on Earth, followed by a time when there were, the latter time having persisted in continuity to the present. This raises the question of where, in that transition, chemicals on Earth became alive, requiring, in turn, a set of premises for how life arose in order to conceptualize the problem in relation to organisms we know today, including ourselves, which brings us to the point of this paper: In the same way that cultural narratives for origins always start with a setting, scientific narratives for origins also always start with a setting, a place on Earth or elsewhere where we can imagine what happened for the sake of structuring both the problem and the narrative for its solution. This raises the question of whether scientific origins settings convey meaning to humans in that they suggest to us from what kind of place and what kinds of chemicals we are descended, that is, to which inanimate things we are most closely related. (shrink)

A discussion of Christian ethics focuses on the physician's image as a parent, warrior against death, expert, and teacher, and the oath that guides his or her practice.

La enseñanza moral católica afirma que es necesario el consentimiento de los pacientes para autorizar las intervenciones sanitariasque les afectan, pero no especifica las condiciones para obtener dicho consentimiento o evaluar la capacidad de decisión. Aquí se presentan los artículos recogidos en este número que los autores han desarrollado a partir de las presentaciones que hicieron durante un coloquio reciente de la Asociación Internacional de Bioética Católica (IACB) celebrado en Quebec, Canadá. Contribuyen a promover el pensamiento ético sobre la capacidad (...) de toma dedecisiones y el consentimiento. De diversas formas, piden que se respete la dignidad de todos los pacientes y que se promueva su participación tanto como sea posible en la toma de decisiones sobre su salud. Consideran que la toma de decisiones es relacional y abarca una variedad de capacidades. Examinan el papel de los miembros de la familia y de otros partidarios de la toma de decisiones en la promoción de las capacidades de los pacientes, cuya condición de salud mental o discapacidad les impide a menudo cumplir con los estándares clínicos y legales típicos para la capacidad de toma de decisiones. (shrink)

The cognitive science of science studies the cognitive processes involved in carrying out science: How do scientists reason? How do scientists develop new theories? How do scientists deal with data that are inconsistent with their theories? How do scientists choose between competing theories? Research on these issues has been carried out by investigators in a number of cognitive science disciplines, particularly psychology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. More detailed accounts of work in this area can be found in two recent conference (...) volumes. (shrink)

A growing body of literature places blame for accounting frauds on the failure of educators to implement ethics training in accounting curriculums in higher educational institutions. Although, the professional accountancy bodies in the UK espouse high ethical standards, others suggest that these bodies are failing to cover ethics in any meaningful way. This study surveys faculty about what is being taught and how much time is dedicated to ethics training. This is the first study to examine whether content suggested by (...) the Ethics Education Framework has been implemented in curriculums in the UK. In addition, we look to determine if there is a notable difference between what is covered in both pre-1992 and post-1992 UK universities. Although we find that post-1992 institutions have implemented the EEF suggestions more than pre-1992 UK universities, current ethics training is insufficient and has not changed much over the last two decades. (shrink)

Is there a way to understand--and, more important, to make use of--the experiences and emotions that we usually think of as being entirely negative? How are we to make sense of life's apparent "non-sense": the loneliness, depression, anxiety, frustration, anger, apathy, and anguish that we are certain to encounter in the course of living? William F. Kraft, a practicing psychotherapist, maintains that we can use all of these experiences in the service of life and fulfillment--once we understand that they (...) are part of the process of growth. It is only when people admit to pain and loneliness, he says, that they can begin to lead meaningful lives. The feelings of nothingness are essential for authentic living--inescapable and even necessary. Dr. Kraft discusses the experience of nothingness--as a fundamental life force and as creative suffering. Then he analyzes the language of nothingness: all the sad words for the bad emotions we meet. He explores the dynamics and meaning of "healthy" and "unhealthy," as applied to our feelings. Proposing that man discovers himself in his sense of nothingness at various stages of his life, Dr. Kraft explores the first emergence into a consciousness of nothingness, in adolescence, as a sense of boredom and cynicism. Next, he deals with the depression, loneliness, and frustration of early adulthood. In full adulthood, maintains the author, the sense of nothingness is banished by commitment and a search for authentic living. Then in middle and old age, he suggests, a positive approach must be forged for experiences of depression, guilt, anguish, and death. In his final chapters Dr. Kraft offers a new psychological approach to death and dying, which are the clearest articulations we know of nothingness. For everyone who thinks that alienation is a symptom of illness, an experience to avoid, or a sign of personal failure, this book is happy--and mandatory--reading.--Adapted from dust jacket. (shrink)

For much of 2021, allocating the scarce supply of Covid‐19 vaccines was the world's most pressing bioethical challenge, and similar challenges may recur for novel therapies and future vaccines. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) identified three fundamental ethical principles to guide the process: maximize benefits, promote justice, and mitigate health inequities. We argue that critical components of the recommended protocol were internally inconsistent with these principles. Specifically, the ACIP (...) violated its principles by recommending overly broad health care worker priority in phase 1a, using being at least seventy‐five years of age as the only criterion to identify individuals at high risk of death from Covid‐19 during phase 1b, failing to recommend place‐based vaccine distribution, and implicitly endorsing first‐come, first‐served allocation. More rigorous empirical work and the development of a complete ethical framework that recognizes trade‐offs between principles may have prevented these mistakes and saved lives. (shrink)

Humans participate in an immense variety of relationships with other persons and other entities: human and nonhuman, living and nonliving, tangible and intangible, real and imagined. Participation in relationships is considered a key benchmark of personhood. Some of these relationships, particularly friendships, involve close emotional attachments, and some friendships have been described since antiquity as spiritual in nature. Different types of friendship depend upon factors such as proximity, social formality, physical intimacy, information exchanged, and the costs and benefits of maintaining (...) the relationship. There are time‐extended processes and narrative practices involved in forming and dissolving relationships. A question is raised how androids (hypothetical humanoid robots that people would accept as equals in society) can participate in friendships with humans and other entities. This article explores the space of friendships with the aim of formulating guidelines for a computational model that can make explicit the information processing requirements and step‐by‐step processes involved with participating in the many different types of friendships, including those known as spiritual friendships. (shrink)

Various laws and theories in the natural and social sciences are presented with a view to discerning the syntactic and semantic characteristics of many idealizations in science. Three different kinds of idealizations are discussed: ideal conditions, ideal cases, and idealized theories. An ideal condition is a formula in which state variables occur, whose existential closure is false, and for which there is another formula that can be constructed out of the original formula such that the existential closure of the new (...) formula is true. An ideal case is a statement which is logically equivalent to a universal conditional which has an ideal condition as its antecedent. And an idealized theory is a set of false universal conditional statements. Alternative syntactic and semantic analyses are viewed and criticized. (shrink)

This paper analyzes recent work in psychology on the nature of the representation of complex forms of knowledge with the goal of understanding how theories are represented. The analysis suggests that, as a psychological form of representation, theories are mental structures that include theoretical entities (usually nonobservable), relationships among the theoretical entities, and relationships of the theoretical entities to the phenomena of some domain. A theory explains the phenomena in its domain by providing a conceptual framework for the phenomena that (...) leads to a feeling of understanding in the reader/hearer. The explanatory conceptual framework goes beyond the original phenomena, integrates diverse aspects of the world, and shows how the original phenomena follow from the framework. This analysis is used to argue that mental models are the subclass of theories that use causal/mechanical explanatory frameworks. In addition, an argument is made for a new psychologism in the philosophy of science, in which the mental representation of scientific theories must be taken into account. (shrink)

Hegel's objection -- Is Kant's idealism subjective? -- An ambiguity in 'subjectivism' -- The epistemological problem -- The transcendental deduction of the categories and subjectivism -- Are Kant's categories subjective? -- Hegel's suspicion : Kantian critique and subjectivism -- What is kantian philosophical criticism? -- Hegel's suspicion : initial formulation -- A shallow suspicion? -- Deepening the suspicion : criticism, autonomy, and subjectivism -- Directions of response -- Critique and suspicion : unmasking the critical philosophy -- Hegel's transformation of critique (...) -- The rejection of Kantian critique : philosophy, skepticism, and the recovery of the ancient idea -- Hegel's epistemology in the shadow of Schelling -- Schulze's skepticism contra the critical philosophy -- Ancient versus modern skepticism : Hegel's difference -- Against the modern conception of rational cognition -- Against modern self-certainty -- The history of skepticism: decline into dogmatism -- Philosophy counter culture and time -- The return to Kantian critique : recognizing the rights of ordinary consciousness -- Two conceptions of philosophical critique -- The return to critique and the relation of philosophy to its history -- The rights of ordinary consciousness and the need for critique -- Critique as the realization of the science of metaphysics -- Hegel's self-transformational criticism -- Presuppositionless philosophy -- The problem of the criterion -- Self-transformational criticism -- The problem of the we' -- Our transformation -- Hegel's alternative model : critical transformation as self-realization. (shrink)

The metamemory approach to memory confidence was extended and elaborated to deal with semantic memory tasks. The metamemory approach assumes that memory confidence is based on the products and processes of a completed memory task, as well as metamemory beliefs that individuals have about how their memory products and processes relate to memory accuracy. In two experiments participants were asked deceptive and nondeceptive questions involving geographical information. In both experiments, as predicted by the metamemory approach to memory confidence, there was (...) a positive confidence/ accuracy relationship for nondeceptive items and a negative relationship for deceptive items. Experiment 2 used items that constrained the memory strategies (e.g., hierarchical reasoning about spatial location) used by the participants. The results supported the hypothesis that the participants were aware of the levels of memory accuracy associated with the different strategies and used that information to generate their memory confidence judgments. (shrink)

The doctrine that there are no logically necessary connections in nature can be used to support both occasionalism, according to which God alone can be a cause, and 'anti-occasionalism', according to which God cannot be a cause. Quentin Smith has recently invoked the 'no logically necessary connections in nature' doctrine in support of the latter. I bring two main objections against his thesis that God (logically) cannot be a cause. The first is that there are good reasons to think that (...) there are irreducible dispositions in nature, and that where such dispositions are manifested, there are logically necessary causal connections. The second objection is that even if the 'no logically necessary connections in nature' doctrine is true, one is not forced to deny causal efficacy to God: with no breach in logical propriety, one may embrace occasionalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Foam-Born Aphrodite and the Mythology of TransformationWilliam HansenIn his account of the birth of Aphrodite (Theogony 176-200), Hesiod tells how Kronos castrated his father, Ouranos, and threw the severed genitals into the sea.1 The narrator envisions Kronos waiting in ambush upon the mainland (or, from another perspective, upon his mother Gaia) with a sickle in his hand. When Ouranos descends, stretching himself out over Gaia in order to engage (...) in sexual intercourse, Kronos takes hold of his father's genitals with his left hand, cuts them off with his adamantine sickle, and casts them behind him. As the severed organ hurtles through the air, blood falls from it onto the land below, impregnating Gaia with several kinds of offspring. It settles finally upon the waters of the sea; in time foam issuing from the organ surrounds it, and within the foam a girl coalesces. Making her way to land, she passes by the island of Kythera, located off the southern coast of the Peloponnese, and reaches distant Cyprus, where she emerges [End Page 1] onto dry land.2 The circumstances of her birth, Hesiod explains, account for her epithet "Fond-of-genitals," just as her particular route is commemorated in the epithets "Cytherean" and "Cyprus-born," which link her to particular sites. She can be said to have been born on Cyprus because it was there that she emerged from her foam-womb, the matrix in which she developed.3180185190195200 [End Page 2]Great Ouranos came bringing on night, and around Gaiahe spread himself out in his longing for love, and was stretched outin every direction. From ambush his son reached outwith his left hand and with his right hand took the huge sickle,180 long and saw-toothed, and furiously cut offthe genitals of his own father and threw them backwards to be bornebehind him. But they did not escape his hand without effect,for all the drops of blood that rushed outGaia received, and in due time185 she brought forth the powerful Erinyes and the great Giants,shining in their armor and with long spears in their hands,and the nymphs whom they call Meliai on the boundless earth.Now after he had cut off his genitals with adamantand had cast them down from the mainland to the stormy sea,190 they were borne along the sea for a long time, and around them whitefoam arose from the immortal flesh, and in it a girlgrew. First she approached holy Kythera, and from thereshe reached sea-washed Cyprus.Out of the sea the reverend and beautiful goddess stepped, and round about195 grass grew beneath her slender feet. Her["Foam-born" goddess and fair-garlanded "Cytherean"]gods and men call Aphrodite, becauseshe grew in foam, "Cytherean" because she reached Kythera, and also"Cyprus-born" because she was born on stormy Cyprus, and200 "Fond-of-genitals" because she came forth from genitals.In this passage the poet manifestly strives to bring Aphrodite into association with as many aspects of her cult as possible while at the same time maintaining a dramatically coherent narrative. Aspects of the goddess that the narrator acknowledges explicitly include the name Aphrodite itself (she develops in aphros, "foam, slaver, froth, sperm");4 her epithet "Fond-of-genitals" (she is born from a severed sexual organ), which suggests also her role as goddess of sexuality; her epithet [End Page 3] Kythereia (she passes near Kythera); and her epithet Kyprogeneia (she comes ashore at Cyprus).5 Aspects of the goddess that are possibly signaled here implicitly are her role as a divinity of the sea (she is born at sea) and her title Aphrodite Ourania ("Aphrodite, Daughter of Ouranos" and/or "Celestial Aphrodite" as opposed to Aphrodite Pandemos, "common Aphrodite").6 So the narrative teems with references to different aspects of Aphrodite.An element of considerable importance in this narrative is foam. The goddess originates in it, and she gets her name from it. The reason why the myth brings Aphrodite and foam into a significant relationship is doubtless because in popular etymology her name... (shrink)

In one of its versions, the principle of sufficient reason maintains that every true proposition has a sufficient reason for its truth. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued against the principle on the ground that there are propositions such as the conjunction of all truths that are ‘too big’ to have a sufficient reason. The task of this article is to show that such maximal propositions pose no threat to the principle. According to what is perhaps the most ‘popular’ (...) version of the principle to sufficient reason (PSR), every true proposition has a sufficient reason why it is true. Peter van Inwagen formulates the principle as follows: ‘for every truth, for everything that is so, there is a sufficient reason for its being true or being so.’ Like many contemporary philosophers, however, he rejects the principle. My purpose here is to show that the main philosophical argument against PSR rests on a mistaken assumption. There is also a ‘scientific’ argument against PSR that turns on considerations of quantum indeterminacy; but that argument lies beyond the scope of this discussion. (shrink)

This book is intended to help transform epistemology - the traditional study of knowledge - into a rigorous discipline by removing conceptual roadblocks and developing formal tools required for a fully naturalized epistemology. The evolutionary approach which Harms favours begins with the common observation that if our senses and reasoning were not reliable, then natural selection would have eliminated them long ago. The challenge for some time has been how to transform these informal musings about evolutionary epistemology into a rigorous (...) theoretical discipline capable of complementing current scientific studies of the evolution of cognition with a philosophically defensible account of meaning and justification. (shrink)

In this book, Sharpe changes that by setting out his state-of-the-art approach to asset pricing in a nonmathematical form that will be comprehensible to a broad range of investment professionals, including investment advisors, money ...

How Do I Save My Honor? is a powerful exploration of individual moral responsibility in a time of war. When individuals conclude that their leaders have violated fundamental ethical principles, what are they to do? Through the compelling personal stories of those in the U.S. and British government and military who struggled with these thorny issues during the war in Iraq, William F. Felice analyzes the degrees of moral responsibility that public officials, soldiers, and private citizens bear for the (...) actions of their governments. Examining the struggles of these contemporary men and women, as well as of historical figures facing similar dilemmas, the author weighs the profound difficulties of overcoming the intense pressures of misguided loyalty, patriotism, and groupthink that predominate during war. (shrink)